Japan's current political economy by unknown
This symposium, cosponsored by the Center on Japanese Economy and Business
and the Weatherhead East Asian Institute of Columbia University, combined 
the expertise of economists and political scientists to present a comprehensive
overview, not only of the economic problems and range of policy prescriptions
confronting Japan, but also to offer insight into the social and political realities
that underlie them. Speakers for this symposium were Lee Branstetter of 
Columbia Business School; John Makin of Caxton Associates LLC and of
American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research; Hugh Patrick of
Columbia Business School; Len Schoppa of the University of Virginia; and 
Gerald Curtis of Columbia University.
After several quarters of vigorous growth, the Japanese economy is experiencing 
a slowdown, leading many to doubt earlier, optimistic assertions that Japan was
finally in the midst of a “genuine recovery.” Was the earlier optimism imprudent?
How effective are recent policy reforms? Is the Bank of Japan’s commitment to
avoid price deflation genuine? How serious is the current budget deficit, and 
what responses to the deficit are appropriate and politically feasible? How can 
the Japanese address inadequate domestic demand? What is the nature of
unemployment and underemployment in Japan, particularly among the young?
How effective has the leadership of Prime Minister Koizumi been? Will the LDP
split? This report includes the full presentations and discussions that addressed
these questions. All reports of the Center on Japanese Economy and Business 
can be downloaded at www.gsb.columbia.edu/japan. 
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that it wasn’t going
to kill all of the 
current recovery.
—John Makin
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INTRODUCTORY REMARKS
LEE BRANSTETTER
Daniel W. Stanton Associate
Professor of Business, Finance
and Economics Division,
Columbia Business School 
This is a very interestingtime to reflect on Japan’s
current political economy. 
Oil prices, at least in nominal
terms, are close to a record
high. U.S. and Japanese military
forces face insurgency in Iraq.
Both the U.S. and Japanese
economies, the world’s two
largest, appear to be slowing
down after several quarters of
very robust growth. We may be
entering a “soft patch,” to quote
Alan Greenspan. This is casting
a bit of a pall on the global
macroeconomy, at least in the
short run. In this context, we’re
very fortunate to hear about
Japan’s current economic and
political situation from some
experts. Our first session’s pan-
elists will be John Makin and
Hugh Patrick, and in the sec-
ond session we will hear from




Principal, Caxton Associates LLC;
Resident Scholar, American
Enterprise Institute for Public
Policy Research
Iwould like to talk about thepath of the Japanese econ-
omy over the past few years.
As most of you know, the
economy has struggled with a
postbubble syndrome since
1990, when the stock market
collapsed, land prices began to
fall, and there was a substantial
erasure of wealth in Japan. In
the 1980s, the Japanese proved
that the private sector could
invest too much, and in the
1990s they proved that the 
public sector could invest too
much as well, thereby driving
the rate of return on investment
to zero or below.
Having been rather bearish
on the Japanese economy for 
a long time, about mid-year 
I joined the converted, who 
suggested that perhaps this
time Japan was emerging from
its very long struggle with infla-
tion and subpar growth. I wrote
a little piece called “Japan
Rising” in July 2004. As I was
writing it, we were finishing 
a quarter that would soon be
reported as a very weak one in
Japan. Of course, I didn’t know
it at the time. 
I think some fundamental
things that have gone on in
Japan are important in generat-
ing the necessary, if not
sufficient, conditions for recov-
ery of its economy. There were
problems that had arisen since
mid-year, when all we had in
hand was two quarters of 6–7
percent growth for Japan. I
have been consistently bearish
on the Japanese economy; 
venturing into the bullish camp
was a big step for me.
I asked myself why I should
be more optimistic about the
Japanese economy in the mid-
dle of 2004 than I had been 
for almost a decade. The first
reason is a simple but very
important one: Japan had
demonstrated over the previous
year that it wasn’t going to kill
all of the current recovery. This
is important, because in 1997,
after a period of substantial 
fiscal stimulus, the Japanese
moved ahead and raised taxes
on consumption, and they
killed the recovery that was
under way at that time.
In August 2000, fearing
inflation, the Bank of Japan
raised interest rates and killed
another recovery. 
Since then, the leadership
of the Bank of Japan was 
transferred to Governor Fukui,
who has made a big difference
in the conduct of monetary 
policy in Japan. He has helped
make a big contribution to 
the conditions necessary for 
a sustainable recovery of the
Japanese economy.
In a sense, Governor Fukui
had absorbed some of the basic
messages about how to run a
central bank and how a central
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bank can help lead an econ-
omy into recovery. When the
environment is such that prices
are falling, rather than rising,
the problem of deflation has to
be dealt with. Governor Fukui
also has two very strong deputy
governors supporting this view.
The story that Governor Fukui
started to put forward very
quickly was that the Bank of
Japan was determined to quell
deflation—the falling prices in
Japan that were sapping the
strength of any likely recovery.
It did this by signaling it would
continue to pursue this and set
interest rates at zero. How was
it going to convince people that
prices might start rising? It put
out the message that it would
add very large amounts of liq-
uidity to the banking system. 
It would be somewhat passive
if the banks weren’t lending,
but the Bank of Japan wanted
to communicate that it was 
prepared to press very hard 
to stop the deflation. This con-
trasted with the previous Bank of
Japan leadership, which seemed
continually afraid of the resump-
tion of inflation; at the first sign
of any pickup in the economy, it
would tighten policy.
A way to turn deflationary
expectations into stable price
expectations is for the central
bank to say that it is committed
to price stability—not only
avoiding rising prices, but also
avoiding falling prices. This was
a huge step. (This message was
consistent with that of the paper
on monetary policy by Kydland
and Prescott that just won the
Nobel Prize in Economics.)
The Bank of Japan followed
up with heavy intervention in
the foreign exchange markets,
allowing that to sharply increase
the monetary base. It announced
increases in the target monetary
base and began to build the
groundwork for it. This was 
no easy task.
This effort was helped by
the then relatively new govern-
ment of Prime Minister Koizumi,
aided by his chief economic
adviser, Heizo Takenaka. We
saw both the government and
the central bank sign off on the
same sheet. The Takenaka
reforms, too, were directed at
turning a dysfunctional banking
system into a potentially func-
tioning one. An economy
cannot recover if its banking
system is not functioning. (It is
still difficult to get credit growth
in Japan, because there’s very
little demand for it. Part of that
has to do with the deflationary
expectations in the country.)
Takenaka signaled that the
banking system was going to
be reformed. Weak banks would
be closed and consolidated into
banks that would function as
financial intermediaries, once
the economy started to recover. 
In addition to a new set of
policymakers in Japan, we had
fortuitous outside help from the
powerful stimulus administered
by the Federal Reserve Bank
and the Bush Administration, in
what amounted to a postbubble
environment in the United
An economy 
cannot recover 
if its banking 
system is not 
functioning.
—John Makin
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States. Ironically, when the U.S.
stock market crashed in March
2000 and we experienced the
9/11 tragedy in 2001, we cre-
ated some preconditions where
extraordinary monetary and 
fiscal stimulus were required in
the United States. These were
undertaken with more success
than those in Japan, because
the United States wasn’t suffer-
ing from a deflationary environ-
ment. The stimulus created a
very rapid growth in demand 
in the United States that spilled
over into Asia, including China
and Japan.
Japan is ideally suited to be
complemented by rapid growth
in China, as Japan is very good
at producing energy-saving
capital equipment, and the
Chinese ought to be in the mar-
ket for that equipment. One of
the other things that helped
Japan expand in 2002 and 2003
was large growth in external
demand from the United States
and China. 
The thing to remember,
where there is a deflationary
environment in an economy
with tremendous excess capac-
ity, is not that supply is scarce,
but that demand is scarce. All
the economic models are built
on the notion that supply is
scarce; you have to use scarce
resources to maximize output,
and the constraint is on avail-
able supply. However, in Asia,
and in Japan in particular, there
still exists considerable excess
capacity, and it is demand that
is scarce. Thus, when external
demand on the order of that
created by the Chinese growth
surge after 2002 occurs, you get
a tremendous boost for export-
driven growth. That certainly
helped Japan. It is very helpful
if there’s a lot of excess capacity,
because there is no pressure on
prices. The capacity is there;
supply is highly elastic, so a
rise in demand creates a sharp
rise in output at stable prices.
Stronger demand was just what
the Japanese economy needed
in 2002–2003. 
There was also considerable
help from domestic demand
growth in 2003. There are
many explanations for this.
One, I would suggest, was the
ability of the Bank of Japan to
convince people that deflation
was not going to accelerate,
that exchanging money for
goods made sense. The insidi-
ous thing about deflation is that
it’s dynamically unstable, and
in a hyperdeflation, the rate of
return on holding money rises
exponentially. You’re always
tempted not to spend now if
you think prices will be halved
sometime later on. When
everybody waits, excess supply
of goods becomes more and
more pronounced, prices go
down, and so on. You have to
break that cycle. 
Central bankers hadn’t seri-
ously thought about breaking 
a cycle of deflation since the
1930s. When Governor Fukui,
the Bank of Japan, and the U.S.
Federal Reserve Bank began to
think about this issue, they real-
ized that the central bank had
to convince people that prices
were not going to be lower
next year. One way to encour-
age that was to send the message
that the central bank would
create as much money/liquidity
as was necessary to make that
happen. That is easier said than
done, but I think that may have
had something to do with the
jump in personal spending that
mirrored the drop in the savings
rate in Japan.
One of the problems that
Japan will have to confront
when the economy does recover
is that interest rates will rise. 
I am concerned about this,
because in a normal economy,
the real return on ten-year
notes will be about 3 percent.
In 2003, the return on ten-year
notes in Japan dropped to as
low as 50 basis points, consis-
tent with powerful deflationary
expectations, but as the econ-
omy recovers and prices
stabilize and other returns 
go up, interest rates will rise.
For Japan, this is a problem
because there’s a large stock of
outstanding debt, roughly 140
percent of GDP, with a deficit
of about 8 percent of GDP. By
comparison, the U.S. deficit is
probably about 4 percent of
GDP at maximum and our debt
runs about 40 percent of GDP,
substantially less than in Japan.
Higher interest rates will create
some dislocations as Japan
returns to price stability.
After mid-year, we saw 
that the second quarter growth
numbers were much weaker
than had been expected. Most
troubling, the growth of nomi-
nal GDP turned negative for
the first time in more than a
year. That means that the
money value total output actu-
ally fell in the second quarter
after very strong growth before-
hand. One problem was much
weaker domestic demand and
weaker investment numbers.
In Japan there still
exists considerable
excess capacity,
and it is demand 
that is scarce.
—John Makin
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The only real growth was 
coming from some external
stimulus that was still operating.
Some other growth was coming
simply from inventory accumu-
lation. Clearly, as we moved
into the second quarter of the
year, the Japanese economy
slowed sharply. As we go for-
ward, it’s questionable whether
we are out of the woods. It’s as
though the Japanese economy
were a patient: we adminis-
tered some medicine, it seemed
that he was up and running,
but now he’s having a slight
relapse. (In fact, third quarter
data also showed zero growth.)
The other problem for
Japan, which is heavily depend-
ent on external demand, is 
a possible slowdown in the
United States and, by implica-
tion, in China. That may be
related to the oil shock that has
hit in the past six months. The
price of oil has risen from an
average of between $25 and
$30 last year to a range now 
of $45 to $55. One problem is
that if prices stay at this level,
U.S. growth will slow, Japanese
growth will slow, Chinese
growth will slow, and world
growth will slow. The IMF
claims that if oil prices stayed
at these levels, Japanese
growth would probably drop
by at least one percentage
point, possibly more if we see
that happening in the context
of a slowdown of global growth.
That is a serious problem.
Moreover, domestic demand
in Japan seems to have weak-
ened again. The employment
situation isn’t improving as rap-
idly as we thought. I think the
health of the Japanese economy
is much more in question now
than it was in mid-year, when I
was a good deal more hopeful.
As usual, the oil shock comes
at the least opportune time.
That said, I think that the
policy apparatus in Japan is still
aimed in the right direction.
The Bank of Japan knows it is
important to continue sending
the message that it’s committed
to maintaining stable prices. 
My guess is that it would be
prepared in the event of another
slowdown to increase liquidity
even more aggressively. It 
certainly is committed to not
allowing the currency to appre-
ciate rapidly because that’s a
deflationary incident that it
can’t afford. It’s going to be
touch-and-go over the next six
months. It would be a lot easier
if we weren’t dealing with $50
per barrel for oil.
HUGH PATRICK 
Director, Center on Japanese
Economy and Business and 
R. D. Calkins Professor Emeritus
of International Business,
Columbia Business School 
Ithought that there might besome places where I could
disagree with John Makin
enough so that we could have
an interesting debate, but,
unfortunately, that’s not the
case. I want to cover three sets
of topics. First, I want to make
a few comments about the fun-
damental transformation that
the Japanese economy is in the
midst of. Second, I want to turn
mainly to the discussion of the
current economy in the near
future. Finally, I want to talk 
a little bit about growth in the
intermediate and long run.
I think it’s important to 
look at the current economy in
the context of what is a more
fundamental, longer-run trans-
formation of the Japanese
economy that’s going to last
two or three decades. This
transformation has been com-
plicated by the bursting of the
stock market and real estate
bubbles in the early 1990s. I
want to emphasize three dimen-
sions of this transformation.
The first is that Japan com-
pleted the process of catch-up
growth, which was the miracle
we talked about, in the 1970s
and 1980s. It moved from a low
income to a mature, rich econ-
omy, with high income, high
level per capita GDP, and that
meant, as Japan approached
the world productivity frontier,
that growth inevitably would
slow down. Slowing growth is
part of the transformation.
The second dimension is
the ongoing demographic tran-
sition. This is most appropriately
thought of in a 100- or 150-year
time span for moving from a
higher birth, high death rate
gradually over time, particularly
throughout the twentieth cen-
tury, to an economy in which
the population has long life
expectancy and is aging. The
fertility rate is below the rate
that will maintain the popula-
The health of the
Japanese economy
is much more in
question now than
it was in mid-year.
—John Makin
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tion at a flat level, and that’s
been true for thirty years. Japan
has a rapidly aging population.
This means that the number of
those of workforce age, which
is defined usually as between
15 and 65, has been declining
absolutely since the mid-1990s.
Probably, Japan’s population
will peak in two years to just
under 128 million and then
begin a slow decline. The
demographic transition is
another part of this fundamental
transformation of the economy.
I would argue that the third
transformation under way is
moving from what might be
called “relationship capitalism”
to more “market-based capital-
ism.” This shows up in the
decline and changed nature 
of the so-called “permanent
employment system,” the main
bank system, and the system of
management’s opaque control
and power.
Let me turn to the current
economic situation. Clearly, the
economy is doing quite well,
even though it has slowed from
its peak earlier this year. The
slowdown from peak is not that
surprising; you can’t expect it
to continue forever. For me, the
key issue is the one that John
Makin identified: Is Japan now
on a path that leads to self-sus-
tained long-run growth, or is it
simply having the best of three
cyclical upswings that have been
the pattern of the last twelve
years? 
As much as I would like to
believe it, and I think many
Japanese—particularly policy-
makers—do, I think it’s
premature to say that Japan’s
growth process is sufficiently
strong to make itself sustaining
and able to get on to the return
to substantial growth. I have
five reasons why I’m still wor-
ried about the economy. 
The first is one John men-
tioned: inadequate domestic
demand. The long-run struc-
tural problem has been that
Japanese domestically have
saved a lot more than they
have been willing to invest for
almost a quarter of a century
now. The problem has been
what to do with those savings.
That is underpinned by this
extraordinarily easy fiscal situa-
tion, a big budget deficit, and
an extraordinarily easy mone-
tary situation in terms of the
Bank of Japan’s zero interest
rate policy.
In the last three or four years,
the decline in the household sav-
ings rate has accelerated. Now,
the household savings rate
seems to be rather low, and
that is a positive thing, because
it means consumption has been
maintained at the expense of
savings. We don’t understand
exactly why that has happened.
I think a lot of it has to do with
the fact that older people who
might have saved their money
to give to their children are
now spending that money to
take care of themselves. Older
people have benefited from the
windfall rise in the value of
their house and other assets,
and now, since those values
are evaporating, they’re contin-
uing their lifestyle. It’s just 
that their children are going 
to inherit less. 
The problem now is that
companies continue to have
rather high net savings rates
over and above their invest-
ment and actually have surplus
cash flow. In the short run,
they need to do that to pay off
their loans, but in the longer
run they’re going to have to
think about a system that has
incentives to pay out more divi-
dends. They need to get more
of that money out of their 
corporate savings and into
households that will spend
some of it.
My second problem is the
high budget deficits. I agree
completely with John that
Japan has to have an easy mon-
etary policy until well beyond
the point when the economy
starts to recover, in order to
maintain the expectations that
growth will persist. The Bank
of Japan says that a slight posi-
tive increase in the consumer
price index is a signal that it
should go ahead and start to
raise interest rates. My feeling 
is that it should delay that, 
and the target should be a CPI
increase of 1 percent, because
the CPI has a technological
bias. Price stability is really a 
1 percent CPI increase.
Third, I really worry about
the labor market. Japan now
has a 4.8 percent unemploy-
ment rate, which by American
standards is pretty good, but by
Japanese historic standards is
pretty bad. Still, I don’t think
that’s the most important indi-
cator of the conditions of the
labor market. The fact of the
matter is that the participation
rate of those of working age 
is the lowest it has ever been
historically. Between 1997 and
2003, employment declined by





to make itself 
sustaining.
—Hugh Patrick
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lost their jobs, and 1.2 million
either never entered the labor
force or left it. That is shocking.
What’s even more important 
is that almost all increases in
employment we see are part-
time jobs, not full-time ones.
Part-time and temporary work-
ers now constitute a quarter of
the labor force. That’s far too
high; it hits young people dis-
proportionately.
Those who are age 20 to
24, who are the so-called “idle
labor” (people neither in school
nor with a job) are 17 percent
of their age group’s labor force;
28 percent of young males and
35 percent of young females
have part-time jobs. Surveys
indicate that most want full-
time jobs. One of the long-run
costs of Japan’s mediocre eco-
nomic performance of the last
twelve years is that young 
people are not getting the job
skill training that they used to
receive in the past. That’s going
to be costly in the longer run.
John and I agree that inade-
quate demand is a key problem,
but there are also problems 
on the supply side, as well.
Companies are burdened with
the excess debts that they took
on in the bubble, and they’ve
been slow to restructure; the
process has taken far too long.
Japan has had what we’ve
called “zombie companies” for
about twelve years now, and
finally they are being dealt
with. Daiei may be taken care
of, according to today’s news-
paper. The process has been
very slow. 
Banks, on the whole, have
now overcome the likelihood
of a systemic crisis, because 
of their high, nonperforming
loans, but the reality is that the
capital base of almost all banks
is still extraordinarily weak.
Banks need more capital and
better business models.
Incidentally, the supply 
side problems, that is to say 
the inefficiencies of resource
allocation, are even more 
pronounced in government
financial institutions and local
government enterprises. Those
are much harder to tackle,
because they are political and
are not subject to the same
degree of market pressures that
private firms are.
Finally, John has alluded to
the huge budget deficit and the
huge government debt to GDP
ratio. These are very important
issues, both economically and
politically. Len Schoppa will
talk a bit about the politics of it.
The Japanese government’s
share of GDP is relatively low,
in terms of its purchases of
goods and services. It’s more
like the United States, not
Europe, but it has to be the
biggest financial intermediary
in the world. It’s a huge collec-
tor of savings and a huge lender
of those savings, through 
various government financial
institutions. When we talk
about the government debt, we
have to strip out those financial
assets and liabilities. The cor-
rect measure of government
debt is the net debt (liabilities
minus assets). It turns out that
about half the government
bonds are held by government
institutions, including the Bank
of Japan. So, they are a wash
on a consolidated basis. That is
important.
For instance, the govern-
ment has borrowed the yen
equivalent of $820 billion to
buy foreign exchange reserves
of $820 billion. You certainly
want to subtract that and count
it as an asset, if you’re worrying
about the debt. Conceptually,
you want a net debt figure
rather than a gross debt figure,
and that gets the government
debt/GDP ratio down to
around, 60, 70, or 80 percent,
instead of 160 percent. The
reality, however, is that the net
debt itself is increasing very
fast, the budget deficit is only
beginning to slow down, and 
it is still very high. So, how
should the debt be dealt with?
There are three issues. The first
is timing—how rapidly (or
slowly) should the process of
reducing the government deficit
occur? I think the Japanese gov-
ernment is trying to do it too
fast; it talks about a primary
surplus of zero by the year
2012 or thereabout. It should
think of a slower, more gradual
process, so that the costs are
shared over a much longer time
period. 
The second issue is how
much taxes must be raised in
the long run to meet the com-
mitments to elderly people,
such as pensions and health
care. That really depends on
the assumptions you make
about the long-run future. The
nature of the demographic tran-
sition needs to be considered.
Will the Japanese population
decline forever and disappear?
That is very unlikely. When will
it stabilize, at what rate, under
what circumstances? These are
key assumptions. How should
The capital base 




8 Japan’s Current Political Economy
it’s unlikely that Japan will be
able to do so. Thus, 2 percent
per capita growth is the most
likely long-run potential
growth. Many people would
say it’s only 1.5 percent per
capita, or something of that
sort. Since the population is
declining, that means the GDP
growth rate will be about 1.5
percent or less. 
There are a couple of 
positives that, over time, will
accelerate the growth rate, as
the adjustment occurs. One is
that productivity, which is
extraordinarily high in manu-
facturing, is extraordinarily low
in many services. As Japan is
able to raise productivity in
services, it will obtain an addi-
tional efficiency kicker, and that
will be very helpful.
The other positive is that
even though the public sector
is not large, it has many pock-
ets of inefficiency: redundancy
and high wages. As that adjust-
ment occurs, Japan will achieve
a more efficient use of resources.
However, that’s more politically
difficult, because you’re running
up against the vested interests
that are supporting the politicians.
My analysis suggests the
economy could grow well for
the next three, four, or five
years if the policies were right.
After that, the economy will
grow at 1–1.5 percent a year, 
if the demographic pattern 
continues. The only thing that
would change that and increase
the GDP growth rate would be
a major change in immigration
policy. Ten or fifteen years
from now, Japan will have to
decide on this issue.
DISCUSSION
AUDIENCE QUESTION
Could you expand on yourcomment about Japan
thinking about its immigration
policy? Also, Japan is lending 
a lot of money to the United
States to support the war in
Iraq. What do you think of that?
HUGH PATRICK
The Japanese don’t thinkthey’re lending money to
the United States to support
the Iraq war. They’re lending
money, because they don’t
want the yen to appreciate. 
It’s very simple. They want to
maintain foreign demand in 
a situation in which domestic
demand has been fairly dicey.
I agree with John’s point that
the yen is not likely to appreci-
ate very much. I think the real
kicker there is China. If the
Chinese exchange rate did
appreciate vis-à-vis the dollar,
it would make it easier for all
the Asian countries to have
their currencies appreciate.
They may want to have greater
stability to the Renminbi than
to the dollar. I don’t see that
coming about any time soon.
As for immigration, of
course Japan is thinking about
it a lot and discussing it pri-
vately. Nothing has been talked
about in public because it’s
such a taboo, difficult subject.
One scenario is that Japan will
engage in five-year contracts, 
as it did in the late 1980s and
early 1990s. This would have
the understanding that the
immigrants don’t bring their
families and that they leave 
at the end of five years. That
could be done extensively for
the generational costs be
spread? Should taxes go up, 
so that you get a balance
within ten years, within a hun-
dred years, or somewhere in
between? That is another kind
of policy issue that’s important.
The third issue is to what
extent elderly people should
benefit from the growth of the
economy as a whole over time.
Should their pensions go up as
the economy rises? How could
that be worked out? Given
these basic variables, you can
do simulations that come up
with all kinds of different solu-
tions. Our colleague David
Weinstein has done a very 
careful analysis, with perhaps
optimistic assumptions, which
suggest the taxes, as a share of
GDP, do not have to go up very
much, and that much of the
current political debate is based
on misguided economic analy-
sis. That paper is very contro-
versial. It’s a good paper, but
when you’re talking about the
projections, you have to look 
at what the assumptions are.
Regardless, this continues to be
an important issue, probably
even more politically than eco-
nomically.
Japan can grow 3–4 percent
a year for the next five years, if
it were able to absorb its labor
and use it fully and effectively;
that’s really an aggregate
demand problem. In the longer
run, as with other rich countries
that are at the technology fron-
tier, Japan probably cannot
grow more than 2 percent per
capita, once this surplus labor
has been absorbed. No other
country has grown faster than
that over ten-year periods, so
The only thing that
would . . . increase
the GDP growth
rate would be 
a major change in
immigration policy.
—Hugh Patrick
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the provision of health services
to young Filipino or Thai
women. You might do the
same things for unskilled work-
ers. The question is, how do
you prevent them from becom-
ing permanent immigrants? 
I’m thinking of this from a very
Japanese view, because the
basic issue here is that Japan 
is such a homogenous society.
Is it prepared to give up that
homogeneity for the sake of
meeting labor shortages? My
guess is no, but I don’t know.
I’m not Japanese. This is going
to be an issue that the Japanese
are going to have to decide.
AUDIENCE QUESTION
Won’t Japan’s budgetdeficit become a huge
burden that will adversely
affect the Japanese economy,
especially when interest rates
go up? Won’t Japan become
another Argentina financially?
JOHN MAKIN
You’ve hit on an importantpoint: why is the big
budget deficit a problem for
Japan? In one sense, it’s very
tempting for the Japanese gov-
ernment to borrow, because
they can borrow short-term at
ridiculously low interest rates,
like seven or ten basis points.
It’s almost like printing money;
government bonds are interest-
bearing liabilities, and money
is a non-interest-bearing liability
of the government. Deficit
financing for the Japanese 
government is also almost like
printing money.
A problem arises if you
have a large stock of debt out-
standing that is short-term debt,
but you still have to refinance
it, because you are not in a
position to pay it back. The
terms on which you refinance
may be that you have to start
paying 2–3 percent instead 
of virtually zero on the new
financing. The classic way in
which debt finance booms end
is that when it comes time to
roll over the debt, if the econ-
omy has picked up or inflation
has returned, instead of bor-
rowing at 5/10ths of 1 percent
you borrow at 1 percent. Your
borrowing costs go up so rap-
idly that you have to actually
raise taxes to cover it. It’s easy
now. The problem arises with a
large stock of outstanding debt
at a time when the economy
recovers. The cost of financing
gets a lot higher.
Suppose you are tempted
today to take out a one-year
floating mortgage to buy a
house worth three times 
your income. It sounds great.
Suppose next year it’s time to
refinance the mortgage and the
interest rate has gone up to
four percentage points. The
cost of continuing to maintain
the borrowing could absorb 
all of your disposable income.
The same thing can happen to
a government.
HUGH PATRICK
John is certainly correct thatonce interest rates rise, they
will increase the government’s
cost of servicing its debt as it
rolls over. However, the Bank
of Japan’s policy is not to raise
interest rates until deflation
ends and good growth is being
achieved. That will increase tax
revenue and reduce the need
for large-scale deficit financing.
Unlike households or corpora-
tions, the Japanese government
can always borrow, in effect
printing money if necessary. 
It will not default on its debt.
LEE BRANSTETTER
In terms of the Argentinacomparison, there are two
important points. First, all the
Japanese bonds are issued in
yen in the domestic currency,
so there’s no exchange rate
problem. Second, almost all of
them are held by the Japanese.
Very little of the Japanese gov-
ernment debt is held abroad,
so that means it’s an internal
problem. This is much different
from the case of Argentina or
other countries that have huge
external debts. Japan is the
largest net creditor in the
world; it’s not just foreign
exchange reserves—Japan
owns all kinds of other assets.
AUDIENCE QUESTION
How can the Bank of Japanguarantee that deflation
will end in the future? Suppose
it doesn’t. What can the Bank
of Japan possibly do?
JOHN MAKIN
It is very difficult. If the Bankof Japan fails, let’s say the
economy slows down and
people become convinced that
deflation is going to continue
and accelerate. It’s dynamically
unstable, because they’ll spend
less money, and the Bank of
Japan can only cut interest
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interest rate rises as the defla-
tion rate picks up. It is a chal-
lenge. Based on the research
that has been done at the 
Bank of Japan and the Federal
Reserve, and the policy options
at the so-called “zero bound,”
my guess is that if deflation
started to run away in Japan,
the Bank of Japan would
undertake huge purchases first,
then maybe investment grade
corporate bonds in the long-
term government bond market.
Then, perhaps it would buy
stocks and/or real estate. 
HUGH PATRICK
If the problem becameextreme, you’re asking, what
are the ways the Bank of Japan
can convince the market that
they are committed to reflation?
The basic way would be to do
something highly unconven-
tional. Certainly, purchasing
stocks or land would be uncon-
ventional, but it would be 
the right thing to do to avoid
deflation. Studies have been
undertaken at both the Bank 
of Japan and the Fed to cover
this contingency. There’s more
they can do by broadening out
the scope of the assets that the
Bank of Japan is willing to pur-
chase, essentially by printing
money.
I am not afraid of the gov-
ernment deficits. I’ve been
saying this for several years—
macropolicy, in fact, consists of
both monetary and fiscal pol-
icy—Japan should engage in a
short-term fiscal stimulus to get
out of deflation and to get the
economy back. After that is
taken care of and the economy
is growing again, the govern-
ment could end that fiscal stim-
ulus. I’m one of the few people
who think that the 
government should cut taxes. 
I wouldn’t increase government
pork barrel expenditures on
more public works in some
politician’s neighborhood. My
statement is theoretically cor-
rect and politically impossible. 
We can understand it con-
ceptually, but I think fiscal
expansion is politically so
unlikely that we just have to
say it’s not in the range of feasi-
ble policy. That says something
about the ignorance of Japan
policymakers about macroeco-
nomic policy. Professor Hamada
of Yale spent two years as head
of the research institute in the
Cabinet Office. On his return 
to Yale he said, “You know, I
can understand microeconomic
policy in Japan, because it’s all
vested interests, but macroeco-
nomic policy—it’s amazing
politicians don’t understand it.
Well, that’s okay, because we
don’t expect politicians to
understand very much, but
bureaucrats don’t understand
macroeconomic policy, and a
lot of academics don’t under-
stand macroeconomic policy.”
Hamada was very scathing in
his comments.
I would argue it’s more
than that. The Ministry of
Finance gives primary emphasis
to the autonomy of its various
bureaus. The Tax Bureau says,
“Never cut taxes!” The Budget
Bureau says, “Never raise
expenditures!” When you have
such a strong mind-set in the
Ministry of Finance, it makes 
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Iwill talk about what I con-sider to be the fundamental
feature of Japanese policy
debate and politics today and
for the foreseeable future, the
characteristic of fiscal stress. It’s
something we’ve already been
talking about, with the discus-
sion of how so many Japanese
are preoccupied by the public
debt and the fiscal problems,
regardless of what a number of
Columbia economists are
telling them. It is a real preoc-
cupation. I got a real personal
sense of that a couple of years
ago, when I was interviewing a
senior Ministry of Finance offi-
cial, and he started lamenting
on how the Ministry of Finance
had lost control of the budget.
It was a time when the Ministry
of Finance had been caught up
in a number of scandals, and it
was spending loads of money
on public works projects. The
official was convinced that the
Ministry of Finance had lost
credibility and would never
have a chance to bring
Japanese public finances back
into order.
As can be seen from the
presidential debate last night
I’m one of the 
few people who
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on television, what we hear
from American politicians is tax
cuts, tax cuts, tax cuts on one
side, and government spend-
ing, government spending,
government spending on the
other side. This way of
American politics is quite natu-
rally a very common feature of
politics around the world. What
politicians like to campaign on
is offering lots of goodies on
the spending side and, if possi-
ble, cutting taxes at the same
time. It’s an incredible contrast
to the situation in Japan. 
Koizumi became incredibly
popular in Japanese politics
when he first came into office
in 2001 under a slogan that
said, “structural reform with no
sanctuary.” He seemed to be
saying, “we’re going to cut a
whole lot of government
spending, we’re going to get
our books back in order, and
we’re going to have a more
neoliberal kind of economic
policy.” He got 80 percent pop-
ularity ratings with this slogan.
We also have talk from the
big business community for the
last year about the need for tax
increases, with the leader of
Keidanren coming out about a
year-and-a-half ago with a pro-
posal to raise the consumption
tax in stages, from its current 5
percent level to 16 percent. An
11 percent tax increase over
eleven years is what he was
calling for. Just imagine in the
American context the business
roundtable calling for a 10 per-
cent tax increase on everyone
and everything.
We have talked about
spending cuts and tax increases
dominating the politics of
Japan, and we heard from
Hugh already about how there
seems to be a sense of urgency
in that Japan needs to bring its
fiscal position into a primary
balance by the year 2012.
Koizumi talked about this in his
speech a couple of days ago.
The Ministry of Finance has
been talking about this also.
This seems to be where many
people are going in terms of
budget policy.
What I want to talk about
today are the reasons why
Japanese politics are so focused
on this fiscal stress situation. I
will look at the issues that are
in the policy debate in this
area, and, finally, how that
relates to the prospects for
Prime Minister Koizumi and the
Liberal Democratic Party (LDP).
This focus on fiscal stress
means that the policy debate,
and politics as a whole, is now
concentrated on at least zero-
sum conflict, or, you might
even say, diminishing-sum 
conflict. For many, many years
Japan had rapidly rising tax
receipts, rapidly rising budgets,
and the LDP thrived in a day
when it could offer goodies to
everyone and tax cuts, too.
Suddenly, Japanese politics are
operating in an environment in
which they need to raise taxes
and cut spending every year,
just to avoid putting the budget
deficit into worse shape. The
questions are, what should we
cut and what should we raise? 
I’ll talk later about some of
the political reasons why fiscal
stress has become the dominant
theme of politics, but there are
underlying economic reasons
for this as well, which we’ve
already started talking about.
One is that Japanese tax rev-
enues currently cover only half
of what the government is
spending. How can we go on
indefinitely in this kind of situa-
tion? Of course, the economists
can tell you that if you just get
your economy growing again,
and inflation going again, the
tax revenues should go up.
Disturbingly for the Japanese,
however, they’ve had a couple
of quarters now of 3 to 4 per-
cent annualized growth, and
their tax revenues haven’t gone
up yet to the degree that would
have been expected. They’re
getting quite nervous about this.
Second, spending is being
pushed up rapidly by aging.
This is almost an automatic
annual increase in spending
that the Japanese government
has to absorb on health care
and pensions, because the 
population of older people is
growing. 
Third is Japan’s interest rate
burden. What Japan needs to
pay in interest every year has
gotten about as low as it can.
The Japanese have been able to
increase the size of the public
debt through the 1990s, while
actually keeping their annual
interest payment burden stable,
because interest rates have
been so low. They kept rolling
over old debt that they may
have financed as much as 6
percent or 5 percent at new
rates of .5 percent or 1 percent.
As long as you could do that,
you could increase the budget
deficit without having interest
payments going up, but they’ve
exhausted that opportunity,
and from this point, interest
Japanese tax 
revenues currently




rates can’t go any lower. As
they continue to increase the
size of their debt, eventually
they will see portions of the
budget that have to go toward
paying the rising interest, and
that makes people concerned.
Let’s talk next about the
political reasons. The Japanese,
with a lower house and upper
house, have staggered election
cycles. They seem to have an
election almost every year.
There’s always something to
talk about. Finally, they’ve
exhausted their elections, and
they’ve gotten to a point where
they could go three full years
with neither a lower nor an
upper house election. This has
not happened in Japan since
1986–89. In the period since
1989, they’ve had an election
nearly every year or every
other year, and this has kept
politicians focused on keeping
the voters happy, first and fore-
most. They wouldn’t raise taxes
and wouldn’t cut spending.
Finally, they have an opportu-
nity. Many people think the
politicians have no excuse
now; they’re not facing the 
voters for another three years.
Now is the time to really push
this agenda of tax increases and
spending cuts, while we have
this political opportunity.
The political opportunity 
is also there because of Prime
Minister Koizumi’s position.
Usually, the Japanese prime
minister is fighting to hold onto
his job. Rarely is he able to last
more than two years, and the
term limits don’t even become
an issue for most prime minis-
ters. The last time this became
an issue was in the 1980s.
However, Koizumi has reached
the point where he’s been re-
elected. He has two more years
in his current term as LDP Party
president, and he can’t be
reelected again as its president.
He doesn’t need to worry about
catering to the LDP and keep-
ing the factions and the back-
benchers happy. He, too, is 
relatively free to promote an
agenda of tax increases or
spending cuts during his
remaining two years.
With the election cycle and
the prime minister operating 
in this way, and the Ministry of
Finance trying to take advan-
tage of it, everybody is pushing
to do something about the
budget deficit now.
These are the issues on the
agenda and they all have to 
do with spending cuts and tax
increases. The first issue that
Koizumi has started to tackle is
cuts in public works spending.
Koizumi gained a lot of popu-
larity by delaying public works
projects and showing the voters
that he’s not going to continue
the old LDP ways. Still, the
Japanese government continues
to spend more on public works
than any other advanced indus-
trialized country, and especially
for a mature economy, it’s inap-
propriate to continue spending
at these levels. This brings us 
to the next two terms, privatiza-
tion and fiscal decentralization.
These are buzzwords that
Koizumi has been talking about
for the last two years, as he
tackles the more difficult struc-
tural issues that are behind the
high spending on public works.
If you’re going to bring public
works spending in Japan down
further, you’ve got to get the
postal savings system under
control. The postal savings sys-
tem sends a huge amount of
savings into inefficient public
works projects and other kinds
of public investment. If you’ve
been following Japanese poli-
tics, you know that Koizumi’s
new big issue is postal privati-
zation. He’s been talking about
it since the beginning of his
term. He had one big push a
couple of years ago that didn’t
go very far, and now he’s push-
ing it again. He’s also talking
about the “trinity reforms” in
public local government
finance, which are supposed 
to bring spending by the local
governments under control. 
Let me also introduce the
issue of pension reform. This
was the big issue last year. 
The Japanese government was
obliged by its pension calendar
to tackle a pension system that
was unbalanced. Every five
years, the government has to
bring its books into some sort
of balance by, if necessary, 
raising premiums and cutting
benefits. This situation became
so dire that it had to do both
last year. Koizumi and the LDP
passed a plan that involved
premium increases. Every year
for the next ten or twelve years,
the pension premiums the
Japanese pay are going to be
going up starting this month by
.35 percent. Next October it
will be another .35 percent. So
by the year 2017, the Japanese
will be spending 5 percent
more of every paycheck on
their pension premiums. 
At the same time that
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absorb this tax increase, he also
asked them to accept a pension
benefit cut. The Japanese gov-
ernment convinced the public
to accept the plan, which
involves a new indexing system
for pension benefits. It used to
be that pension benefits were
linked to inflation and wages,
so that they increased every
year except during deflation.
The architects of the pension
system realized that the popula-
tion shrinkage was going to
make this unsustainable. They
came up with a new system
that indexes pension benefits 
to the total wages produced by
the Japanese economy.
That sounds reassuring, 
if you live in a country where
there are always more workers,
so as everybody’s average
wages go up, it seems the total
wage is bound to go up, too.
However, in Japan’s situation,
even if average wages continue
to go up a little bit, because the
number of workers is decreas-
ing so fast over the foreseeable
future, they know this is going
to result in a pension benefit
cut. As the total wage earnings
of the Japanese population 
go down, Japanese pensions
earned in the future will also
decline. This was passed by
Koizumi last year, and it was
the big issue in the upper house
election this summer. It didn’t
make Koizumi very popular. 
How, exactly, is this affect-
ing politics, Koizumi’s popularity,
and the LDP’s popularity? 
Well, what’s interesting about
Koizumi’s tenure is that he was
amazingly successful for the
first two years of his term in
building up his popularity,
even as he talked about spend-
ing cuts. In fact, by taking on
the public works issues, he was
able to do, arguably, the right
thing economically and still
gain a lot of popularity. He
took on his opponents in the
LDP who wanted to continue
spending money on public
works, especially those who
are heavily invested in political
careers that depend on con-
struction spending. Koizumi
gained popularity by taking on
these people and refusing to
accept their arguments.
The problem was that after
a few cuts in public works
spending, once he began tack-
ling these structural issues, 
his LDP backbenchers started
standing up and challenging
him. There’s nothing like zero-
sum politics to get the losers
fighting like mad, and that’s
what the Hashimoto faction did
when Koizumi tried to push
postal privatization about a
year-and-a-half ago, and it
came to the legislature. They
inserted enough compromises
in there to ensure that it became
relatively meaningless in terms
of affecting the flow of savings
through the postal savings sys-
tem into public works projects.
Koizumi tackled a big pub-
lic corporation called “Japan
Highway,” which spends huge
sums of money on building
highway networks and toll
roads. He tried to argue for 
privatizing this company, and
some people working for him
tried to design this reform so
that spending on highways
would go down. When this
came before the legislature,
Koizumi’s backbenchers and
his party inserted enough com-
promises into the legislation so
that there has been no reduc-
tion in the planned size of the
highway network, despite all of
Koizumi’s rhetoric. He’s come
up against the limits of what he
can do with his own party.
The remaining reforms 
that Koizumi has are much less
popular. As you go forward to
the next issue of postal privati-
zation, this is not the kind 
of issue that wins 80 percent
popularity ratings. Japanese
newspapers have been asking
the voters what issues they care
about, and postal privatization
is down at the bottom. Very
few people think this is impor-
tant. They value the post office;
delivery is reliable. Japanese
letters get there the next day.
Postal banks are incredibly con-
venient, and your money is
safe. Voters are not particularly
enthusiastic about postal priva-
tization. Koizumi has not been
able to explain clearly how 
privatization is going to trim
public works spending.
All this talk about spending
cuts, postal privatization, and
fiscal decentralization might
threaten the structural reforms
that would make it difficult for
the Hashimoto faction to get
the pipeline of money flowing
again to its districts. This has
increased tension between
Koizumi and his opponents
within the LDP. There is always
talk about whether or not there
will be another split of the LDP
because of this tension. While I
certainly agree that there is a
lot of tension, for a split to hap-
pen, one party needs to see the
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to the point of a split. Right now,
it gains political advantage by
playing up its arguments. The
Hashimoto faction gains popu-
larity with its voters in the
countryside by taking on
Koizumi. Koizumi gains a lot 
of popularity in the urban areas
by saying he’s fighting the
Hashimoto faction and will stop
the flow of money to the pork
barrel. They both gain popular-
ity by fighting. I don’t think
Koizumi’s opponents will bene-
fit from a split. If they split 
the party right now and make
Koizumi the victim of some sort
of Hashimoto coup, Koizumi
becomes a hero, and they don’t
have a popular leader who can
take him on. They’re not going
to push it to a split.
Koizumi, on the other hand,
could have done this two years
ago when he was very, very
popular. He could have pushed
things to the point of a split
and been at the head of a pop-
ular anti-old LDP movement.
He didn’t do it then, and now
all he’s got is postal privatiza-
tion. It’s really hard for me to
see how he could say, “I’m
going to split the LDP over the
postal privatization issue” and
expect large numbers of voters
and politicians to follow him. 
The one possibility is that
Koizumi decides to go down in
a blaze of glory. He only has
two more years; he cannot get
reelected LDP president and
continue as prime minister in
that role. It’s possible that as
his term is approaching its end,
he might see a moment where
he can say, “Okay, you’re not
going to go with my postal pri-
vatization; I’m going to bring
down the LDP with me and
quit the party, make no plans
to lead an alternative movement,
and just leave the Hashimoto
faction to fend for itself against
the Democrats and whoever
else enters the political arena.”
GERALD CURTIS
Burgess Professor of Political
Science, Columbia University
Iwill have something to sayabout this administration and
some of its policies, but first I
want to step back and give
some historical context to the
current situation. It’s very
important to understand that a
lot of what is happening in
Japan today is the result of the
cumulative impact of changes
that occurred in a period that
the Japanese refer to as the
“lost decade,” the 1990s. It was
not a lost decade, however; it
was a watershed era in modern
Japanese history. So much
changed in the 1990s: values,
lifestyle preferences, and insti-
tutions, including the govern-
ment bureaucracy. There were
changes in terms of a substan-
tial breakdown of traditional
social networks, which has
both positive and negative
aspects. There has been a kind
of growing personal isolation
and anomie, for example,
reflected in the pitiful spectacle
of people searching for others
over the Internet with whom
they commit group suicide. 
There were changes in the
impact of globalization on
Japanese companies. Why are
strong Japanese companies
stronger today than they were 
a decade ago? No doubt it has
to do with booming exports to
China and a new sense of con-
fidence in the financial system,
in part, because there’s now 
a head of the Bank of Japan
who conveys a sense of com-
petence, which his predecessor
did not. Also, it is because
there has been a decade of
efforts to streamline, to ration-
alize, and to become more
efficient. I want to stress that
we cannot understand what is
going on in Japan today if we
dismiss the past fifteen years
since the bursting of the bubble
as simply a “lost decade.” What
was lost was the opportunity 
to grow the GNP faster, but in
the process, many other things
were gained. 
Now, when we look at 
politics there does not seem to
have been much change over
the past decade, at least at first
glance. In 1993, many observers
believed that the LDP had no
future. More than a decade
later, it is still in power, albeit
in a coalition. Not that much
has changed on the surface, 
but there are undercurrents of
change. There has been a seri-
ous weakening of the structural
supports for the political sys-
tem, the economic system, and,
in many ways, the social system
in Japan. As these pillars have
eroded, a process has been put
in place to create new struc-
The 1990s was not
a lost decade; 
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tures, but there is an inevitable
lag effect, so we can see what
is weakening but not what 
is going to replace outdated
institutions. I have no doubt,
however, that this is a major
transformative period in Japan-
ese history, the third great
transformation in modern his-
tory after the Meiji Restoration
and the post–World War II U.S.
Occupation.
Another example of change
that is of long-term significance,
though its effects are not yet
apparent, involves higher edu-
cation. The privatization of the
national universities may not 
be all its boosters have claimed
for it, and there surely will be
problems with its implementa-
tion, but it is a very significant
reform, one that is going to
introduce a degree of competi-
tion into the higher education
system that has been lacking.
Moreover, reforms in the higher
education system reflect and
are a response to changes in
Japan’s social structure and its
governmental and economic
institutions. There has been a
rush to create graduate school
programs in law, public policy,
accounting, and the beginnings
of graduate programs to train
journalists. These developments
are a response to the break-
down in many traditional ways
of training people and are a
response to the need for new
skills and new methods for
instilling them in young people
today. 
Even if we recognize that
the 1990s were not “lost” and
that there were important
changes, the question remains:
why did not change occur
faster and why was it not more
far reaching? Some economists
seem to believe that it is the
fault of ignorant or corrupt
politicians, since, obviously, if
Japanese political leaders had
been rational they would have
done precisely as the econo-
mists prescribed. That is not the
reason. Yes, there are a lot of
ignorant politicians, I’m not
arguing with that. There also
are a lot of politically ignorant
economists. Why was change
slow? It seems to me that the
most important reason is that
the Japanese public insisted
that change be slow. Every
society has to strike a balance
between considerations of pre-
serving the existing social order
and emphasizing economic effi-
ciency. The United States and
Japan are at opposite ends of
the spectrum in terms of the
values they attach to these two
important objectives. In the
United States, people generally
accept the proposition that 
sustaining economic efficiency
sometimes requires painful 
dislocations, including, most
prominently, the firing or layoff
of redundant workers. The
Japanese have made a public
social choice for preserving the
social order, even if it means
that efficiency gains are denied
or are accomplished only over
an extended period of time.
Lifetime employment is not 
disappearing, even though it 
is being modified. This is not
because Japanese fail to under-
stand what needs to be done,
but because preserving the
social order in a large company
characterized by lifetime
employment is considered to
be essential for the continued
effective functioning of this
institution. It is rational in
Japanese terms, and it means
that things take a long time to
change.
The same observation can
be made about fiscal policy.
Whether it’s Koizumi as prime
minister, or Mr. Okada, the
head of the Democratic Party,
Japan will have to raise social
security premiums and reduce
social security payouts. Public
works expenditures will have
to be cut. One way or another,
the government will move in
the direction of reducing the
yawning gap in government
revenues and government
expenditures. Yet, this problem
is going to be dealt with in a
relatively slow and gradual
manner, rather than in the
shock treatment way that some
propose. Although analysts
may predict an imminent fiscal
crisis, this issue is not going to
drive the voting public.
This reality of Japanese
preferences helps explain
Koizumi’s popularity. Koizumi
promises change, which the
public knows is needed, and
he actually does much less 
than what he proposes, which
the public finds reassuring.
Basically, Koizumi has been
saying that there will be some
pain but that it will not so sud-
den or drastic that people will
want to scream, rather than just
say “ouch.” That is basically
what the public seems to want.
I do not believe that there is
any chance that Koizumi is
going to take a tougher posi-
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What about raising taxes?
Koizumi has made it quite clear
there will be no consumption
tax increase on his watch. He’s
not going to change his view
on that. What about spending
cuts? Yes, there will be some,
including, interestingly enough,
given popular assumptions
about an expansion of Japan’s
military role, cuts in defense
spending, and no big spending
increases. 
What Koizumi is doing that
is really important in the long
term is changing the rules of
the political game in Japan. 
I have been critical of him for
compromising too easily and
not using his power to see his
major policy initiatives through
to their conclusion. Koizumi
has a short attention span; he
gets really excited about an
issue, jumps in with both feet,
and then leaves it to others
while he goes on to the next
issue. Still, you have to give
Koizumi a great deal of credit
for having the courage to
change the rules of the political
game. I don’t believe that the
Japanese media grasps yet this
important contribution that
Koizumi has made. The mind-
set of Japanese political reporters
is pretty out of date; they inter-
pret everything within the
framework of the old political
rules. Newspaper predictions 
a few weeks ago of Koizumi’s
impending cabinet reshuffle 
are a good case in point. There
was a great deal of speculation
about how many Hashimoto
faction members would be
brought in, about how Koizumi
would compromise with the
important party bosses, and the
like, but Koizumi does not play
by those rules. He plays by 
the rules he believes in. In his
view, it is his government and
his cabinet, and if the LDP does
not like it, it can make some-
one else prime minister. This
leaves his LDP opponents
apoplectic, but it leaves Koizumi
very much in charge. He is
changing the rules of the game
and he is blocking the LDP
politicians’ access to the kind 
of resources they’ve had in the
past, especially public works.
Koizumi is not eliminating it,
but he has made it much more
difficult for the politicians and
the LDP to get that pork barrel
and roll it down to their con-
stituencies.
Koizumi has moved the
center of gravity of the policy-
making process out of the LDP
and into the prime minister’s
office. This is very important in
the long term. The policymak-
ing process cannot go back 
to what it was before; there’s
now a real conflict between the
prime minister and the LDP
over control of policy. This is
the theme of my talk today,
that the 1990s were not “lost,”
but were, rather, a “watershed”
decade in Japanese history.
Wherever Japan goes in the
future, it’s not going back to
what it was before the early
1990s.
Takenaka’s role in financial
reform has been mentioned, but
what has not been noted is that,
in addition to forcing the banks
to clean up their balance sheets,
he also, to some extent, has
reformed the way that bureau-
cracy operates. This is part of 
a much bigger, very important
story in Japan. The role of the
government in the economy
has been shrinking. At the same
time, the relationship between
the bureaucracy and the private
sector has become more formal
and transparent. The informal
mechanisms of elite coordina-
tion, which is the key character-
istic of Japan postwar politics,
coordinating bureaucrats and
politicians, the business com-
munity and the state, the
opposition parties and the LDP,
are all being undone. They are
eroding and being replaced by
more transparent rules. The way
the FSA relates to the banking
community is fundamentally
different from the way the
Ministry of Finance had related
to the banking community. In
the old system, bank officials
who were tagged with the job
of interacting with Ministry
bureaucrats, on the golf course,
over dinner, and in other infor-
mal settings, could coordinate
with the bureaucracy and keep
the convoy system in forma-
tion. You don’t need many
regulators in that kind of sys-
tem. Today, the relationship is
more distant, more formal,
more rules-based, and there 
are no longer the MOFtan, the
bank executives whose job it
was to interact with the bureau-
crats, and there are a lot of
regulators. The irony of the
shrinking of the government
role in the economy is an
increase in rules and in the
number of people needed to
enforce those rules. This is a
very different system from the
one Japan had in the past.
The irony of Koizumi’s 
success is that he has slowed
You have to give
Koizumi a great
deal of credit 
for having the
courage to change
the rules of the
political game.
—Gerald Curtis
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the process of political change
in Japan. Just imagine that if
Mr. Hashimoto had become
prime minister two years ago,
chances are quite good that it
would have provoked a split 
in the LDP and major political
change. Koizumi has been so
popular that he brings votes to
a party, the LDP, which can no
longer get those votes on its
own. The LDP is like a very
impressive edifice sitting on a
weakened foundation; serious
fissures and even collapse can
happen at any time, and in my
view it will do so when Koizumi
is gone. I do not mean to say
that Koizumi has not done
important and useful things. He
has done good things for the
long-term future of Japanese
politics, but in terms of the
party system, he has prevented
the inevitable change that has
to occur, sooner or later.
One of the issues for the
LDP is that Koizumi will be out
of office in a couple of years,
and then there will be an elec-
tion. How do you win that
election? Well, the way to win
the election in Japan now is
very different from the way it
was fifteen or twenty years ago.
The machine that turns out the
votes cannot be relied on to
keep the LDP in power any
longer. To win the election
now means finding a leader
who can appeal to the public,
rather than one who can man-
age power relations within the
party, which used to be the
major qualification for leader-
ship. There is no one like
Koizumi in Japanese politics,
and anyone who tries to mimic
his style will look like a poor
shadow of Koizumi. One possi-
bility is that the LDP will try to
find someone it can put for-
ward as a symbol of the “new”
LDP. This has been done in the
past, for example when “clean”
Miki was made prime minister
in the wake of the scandals
involving Prime Minister
Tanaka. Today, the option
might be to make a woman
party president. The name of
Noda Seiko has been bandied
about by senior party leaders
who believe someone like her
might just be popular enough
to help the LDP win the elec-
tion and compliant enough not
to challenge the party bosses.
What difference would it
make if the Democrats come 
to power? Not much, in terms
of policy, in my view. The
Democrats and the LDP repre-
sent different shades of gray on
most issues, rather than a black
and white choice, which is
understandable in a society
bereft of deep and antagonistic
social cleavages. The Democrats
are now trying to reach out into
rural Japan, because you have
to win the rural seats if you’re
going to get a majority. The
LDP, on the other hand, has to
reach the urban voter more
than it has, if it hopes to stay in
power. Koizumi understands,
but the party is very resistant 
to moving away from its rural
base. 
In terms of the policy
process and the general thrust
of domestic policy, there is a
shift of gravity to the prime
minister’s office, the kantei, but
it has not yet established itself
as the undisputed center of the
policymaking process. Members
of the Council on Fiscal and
Economic Affairs often express
frustration at the lack of imple-
mentation of their proposals,
because of the power of the
line ministries to sabotage what
they do not like.
Nonetheless, the process 
is becoming more centralized
in the kantei, and the direction
of policy is toward supporting
greater privatization and com-
petition, shrinking the role of
the state in the economy,
restoring the health of the
financial system, getting the 
fiscal deficit under control, and
shifting priorities toward the
urban voter.
Reform of the government
structure and of politics will
continue, but how you evaluate
them is pretty much a matter 
of whether you want to see the
cup as half full or half empty.
There’s a new system of vice
ministers, for example, which
was supposed to constrain 
the power of the bureaucrats.
Maybe it will, over time, but 
it has not done so yet. These
vice ministers are chosen by
the party on the basis of times
elected and factional affiliation,
unlike the ministers themselves,
whom Koizumi chooses with-
out regard to seniority or
faction. Perhaps that will hap-
pen to vice ministers over time,
but for now, this position has
none of the importance compa-
rable posts have in European
parliamentary democracies. 
The pace of change is
slow—too slow perhaps—but
is proceeding in the right direc-
tion, and anyway, it is a pace
and direction that the Japanese
public seems to support.
Today, the option
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Japanese politics and govern-
ment are giving the Japanese
public, for better or worse,
what it is asking for. That may
disappoint economists and for-
eign businessmen and political
leaders who believe they know
what is best for Japan, but
Japanese leaders listen to their
voters far more intently than
they listen to a lot of well-
meaning advice from others. 
DISCUSSION
AUDIENCE QUESTION
Is the topic of immigration in Japan off the table com-
pletely, or is there any prospect
of this becoming a real issue?
LEN SCHOPPA
Irecently saw that a businessgroup actually talked pub-
licly about the need to plan for
increased immigration in the
future. I was quite surprised to
see that. As we heard earlier,
we almost never hear anybody
in public talk about how immi-
gration has got to be part of
Japan’s solution to its demo-
graphic challenge. I have yet
to hear politicians talking
openly about immigration. I
watched the specialized agency
within the Ministry of Health
and Welfare that is responsible
for demographic projections,
and which had to come up
with something to put into its
projections about immigration,
take recent trends, which were
about a net 50,000 people
coming in each year, and it
was willing to project double
that. Eventually, it projected
that 100,000 net new immi-
grants would come into Japan
each year, whereas the United
Nation’s numbers were in the
range of up to 3 million immi-
grants each year. This is more
like the kind of numbers Japan
would need, if it wanted to
keep the size of its work force
stable. Nobody is going to talk
about the numbers needed to
make a real dent in the declin-
ing working age population.
GERALD CURTIS
Several business leaders are now quite outspoken
about the need for Japan to
have a more open immigration
policy. What Len is referring
to is the chairman of
Keidanren, who is also the
chairman of Toyota. There is
increasing talk in the business
community about the need for
immigration.
Another point is that there
is a lot more immigration in
Japan than most people real-
ize. There are probably more
than a million illegal or dis-
guised immigrants in Japan.
There are, particularly, Chinese
and other Asians who are on
student visas. The restrictions
on work are relaxed in Japan;
you can work twenty hours a
week on a student visa. 
Some prefectural govern-
ments have had programs to
bring workers from Southeast
Asia in “on-the-job training.”
Well, it’s not on-the-job train-
ing; it’s on-the-job working,
six months cycling in and out.
Now, does that mean that
Japan is going to have changes
in immigration policy that make
it look like Germany, France,
Britain, or the United States?
No, I don’t think that’s going to
happen any time soon, but
market demands for the impor-
tation of labor are bound to
increase, and with them gov-
ernment policy will change to
accommodate more immigrants
within strict bounds. 
So, there’s change under
way. It’s not going to turn
Japan into an immigrant soci-
ety, but it’s going to move a
little bit further in that direction
than I think many people tend
to believe. I get a sense that
Japanese attitudes about non-
Japanese in Japan are much
more relaxed and accepting
today than they were before.
It’s considered to be natural
that there are a lot of foreigners
doing lots of things in Japan,
including things that, in the
past, only Japanese were
expected to do. The direction
of change is there. The pace,
yes, is slow. I would empha-
size, however, that the aging 
of Japan’s population, which 
is not going to be affected by
immigration, is the major rea-
son to expect relatively low
growth in the future. 
HUGH PATRICK
One difference betweeneconomists and political
scientists, I think, has to do in
terms of what we think is a
good society or something of
that sort. Maybe we think simi-
larly, but from the economist’s
point of view we’re really
interested in GDP per capita.
We’re interested in the welfare
of each individual, and we
don’t care so much how many
individuals there are.
If you’re interested in
power as the nation-state, then
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you’re interested in total GDP
and the growth of total GDP,
because that’s a measure of
power. I would say there’s a
contrast here. From the view-
point of economists, it’s not
necessarily a bad thing to have
a decline in population, if it
goes about at the same time
with a continued increase in
income per capita. In that
sense, Japan might be a more
pleasant country if everybody
living in an apartment could
knock out the wall to the apart-
ment next door and take it
over, because there’s half as
many people and they have a
lot more space and the sub-
ways would be less crowded,
and so forth. You could make
an argument that having a
smaller population is not 
necessarily a bad thing for 
any country. It’s true of every
advanced country except the
United States that the popula-
tion is on an inexorable trend of
decline. This is going to be the
exciting new sort of social issue
of the next thirty years—how 
do societies respond to this?
AUDIENCE QUESTION
Can you explain what it isthat has led to what you
have called a new emphasis on
transparency and formal rules?
GERALD CURTIS
At the heart of it are thechanging values that
come with affluence and
urbanization and so on, com-
pounded by the difficulties of
the 1990s. In terms of social
structure, there has been a
decline of the kind of traditional
social networks that make pos-
sible the informal coordination
that characterized the postwar
system. The change is captured
in a signboard you can see
around downtown Tokyo. Put
up by the local ward police
department, its title says in
large letters, “manaa kara
Ruuru E,” “from manners to
rules,” or, more freely, “from
informal understandings to 
formal rules.” The sign tells
people that is illegal to throw
bottles in the street and so on,
behavior that was earlier
thought to be constrained by
informal understandings but
that is now regulated by law.
Obviously, when you rely
more on law than on informal
and implicit rules, you are cre-
ating a situation that requires
lawyers, certified public
accountants, and other special-
ists. It is no coincidence that
there is now a boom in gradu-
ate programs in law, accounting,
and so on. I am talking about a
trend, not a sudden shift. The
process is evolutionary, not dis-
continuous. However, there is
no doubt that there is an inter-
esting institutional evolution
going on in Japan that is creat-
ing new kinds of formal insti-
tutions that are more flexible
and more transparent than in
the past and obviating the need
for many of the informal mech-
anisms that were so important
previously. This is a long-term
process, but a very important
one. 
Finally, on the domestic
economy, it is interesting to
note that external economic
developments, particularly the
development of the regional
and bilateral free trade agree-
ments (FTAs) in the Asia region,
are creating pressure for domes-
tic change in Japan. In order for
Japan to forge such agreements
with other countries in Asia, it
needs to liberalize agriculture
to some extent and provide
opportunities for labor to enter
Japan from such places as the
Philippines, which is interested
in getting access to Japan for
nurses, and Thailand, which
wants to be able to have peo-
ple work in Japan’s care of the
elderly and household care
industries.
In the past year or so, the
tenor of the debate over agri-
cultural protection has shifted
quite sharply. There seems to
be growing support for the idea
that Japan should shift away
from reliance on high tariff
walls and adopt an incomes
support policy more akin to
what is common in Europe.
The Democratic Party has been
pushing this approach, but so,
too, have important voices in
the LDP, and even within the
bureaucracy. Rather substantial
change in agricultural policy is
likely, even though this poses
risks to the LDP’s core support.
It is being driven by outside
events and is a commentary on
how profound the domestic
political consequences of glob-
alization are. 
There has been 
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